| Glenbrook rail accident | |
|---|---|
| Details | |
| Date | 2 December 1999 |
| Time | 8:22 am |
| Location | Glenbrook, New South Wales |
| Country | Australia |
| Rail line | Blue Mountains railway line |
| Operator | Great Southern Railway, CityRail |
| Type of incident | Collision |
| Statistics | |
| Trains | 2 |
| Deaths | 7 |
| Injuries | 51 |
The Glenbrook rail accident occurred on 2 December 1999 at 8:22 am in New South Wales, Australia, in which seven passengers were killed and 51 passengers were transported to hospital with injuries.[1] The accident occurred when an interurban train collided with the rear wagon of the Indian Pacific. It happened on a curve of track east of Glenbrook railway station on the CityRail network between Glenbrook and Lapstone.
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Prior to the accident, the Indian Pacific passed a failed red signal at Glenbrook platform and came to a stand at a second failed red signal. The driver of the train alighted to use the lineside signal telephone to call the Area Train Controller for authority to pass the signal at danger, however as there was no dial tone the driver incorrectly believed the phone to be out of service. A delay of approximately seven minutes resulted despite the fact the locomotive was equipped with a radio (at that time it was not procedure for the privately owned National Rail Corporation to use onboard radios to contact train control).
In the accident, an interurban passenger train restarted with authority after stopping at the still failed red signal at Glenbrook platform and collided shortly after with the rear of the Indian Pacific long distance passenger train still waiting at a failed red signal in the following block. A number of factors were involved, from equipment breakdown to poor phrasing of the safeworking rules. The most important factor was that the interurban picked up too much speed after restarting from the signal at stop, and was not able to see the rear of the Indian Pacific around a sharply curved and deep cutting in order to stop in time to avoid the collision.
The track was curved to the left, the train was using the lefthand track, and the driver was sitting on the left side of the front car of the train. The track was in a narrow rock cutting. These four factors contributed to less than average visibility.
If the curve had been a right hand curve, on a wide embankment, then visibility would have been better than average.
Seven people were killed in the accident. A Commission of Inquiry headed by Justice Peter McInerny investigated the accident.[1]
The Commission of Inquiry found that the accident occurred after a power failure disabled two consecutive signals. Due to the signals' fail safe design, both automatically exhibited danger (red).
Both trains obtained permission from the Signalman at Penrith to pass the first failed signal. The driver of the Indian Pacific obeyed an operational rule requiring him to proceed with "extreme caution", and to stop at the second failed signal for a set period of time. In contrast, the driver of the interurban train was unaware of or did not obey the operational rule, and instead proceeded "normally". In consequence, the Indian Pacific had not cleared the second signal before the interurban arrived.
The Commission of Inquiry found fault with a number of procedures, their application by railway employees, and the training those employees had received. Among other factors, it found that:
All seven people who died were in the front compartment of the first carriage of the interurban train. After the driver saw the stationary Indian Pacific, he ran through the front compartment (the dead-man's brake was automatically activated) to the lower deck of the carriage telling the passengers to get down. The driver was badly injured but survived because of this. As the driver ran through, a man from the front compartment ran to the upper deck to warn the passengers there and he survived as well.
The train was a 4-car standard interurban V set, labelled V21. The leading motor carriage, DIM8067, received critical damage to its front and lower compartments. Rather than scrapping the car, due to a shortage of motor carriages in the fleet, the car was repaired and reconstructed. To avoid any reference and insensitivity to the victims of the accident, DIM8067 was re-numbered DIM8020.
The black box event recorders were either yet to be installed or were not activated.
When passing a signal at stop, the driver and the train guard exchange bell signals so that the guard knows what is going on. When passing such a signal, especially one positioned at a platform, the driver is so accustomed to accelerating to normal speed out of habit, that it may be difficult for the driver to remember to keep the train's speed to a slow speed. This is very dangerous. It is up to the guard to observe the train's speed and to apply the brakes if necessary.
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